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FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS:
PRICELESS OR WORTHLESS? AWARDS
OF MONEY DAMAGES UNDER
SECTION 1983*
Robert L. Spurrier, Jr.**
Victims of constitutional rights violations are authorized by Con-
gress in 42 U.S. C. § 1983 to seek damages from the offender. Profes-
sor Spurrier contends, however, that the Supreme Court has thwarted
the effectiveness of Section 1983 by limiting the scope ofpossible de-
fendants and the amount of damages that can be recovered Professor
Spurrier offers suggestions to ameliorate Section 1983 as a remedy for
constitutional wrongs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most students of American public law are prone to refer to the
* This article is taken from a paper delivered at the 1984 national convention of the
American Society for Public Administration, and the contents are in part taken from the author's
forthcoming book, Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, ©1984 by Associated Faculty Press, Inc., Port
Washington, New York, by permission from Associated Faculty Press, Inc. The Tulsa Law
Journal and Associated Faculty Press, Inc. have granted permission for this article to be copied
for classroom use in a nationally accredited law school, provided that (1) copies are distributed at
or below cost, (2) the author and Tulsa Law Journal are identified, (3) proper notice of copyright is
affixed to each copy, (4) such use is one-time only, with notification to Associated Faculty Press,
Inc., (5) all further copying and reprinting must be negotiated with Associated Faculty Press, Inc.,
Port Washington, New York.
** Professor of Political Science and Associate Director of Arts and Sciences Extension,
Oklahoma State University; A.B., A.M., University of Missouri; Ph.D., University of California,
Santa Barbara.
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rights of the individual which have been enshrined in the Constitution
in terms bordering on reverence. It is not unusual to hear these rights
described as priceless. Supreme Court opinions which span two centu-
ries suggest that the federal judiciary is seriously interested in guarding
the rights of the individual. Chief Justice John Marshall revered indi-
vidual rights in Marbury v. Madison' when he stated: "The very es-
sence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to
claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury."2 The
importance of individual rights had not diminished almost two hun-
dred years later when Justice William Brennan remarked in Owen v.
City of Independence, Missouri3 that "A damages remedy against the
offending party is a vital component of any scheme for vindicating
cherished constitutional guarantees. ... I
Congress provided a vehicle to safeguard these rights in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 which states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively
to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the
District of Columbia.5
The statute traces its ancestry to the Ku Klux Act of 1871.6 Although
enacted to protect the newly-freed blacks from lawless activities of
whites in the southern states,7 the statute prohibits the deprivation of
any federal right, privilege or immunity held by any person. Thus the
broad language of Section 1983 offers potential as a powerful tool to
protect and preserve constitutional rights.
This article examines the extent to which the Supreme Court has
interpreted Section 1983 in a manner consistent with the high aspira-
1. 5 U.S. 137 (1 Cranch) (1803).
2. Id at 163.
3. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
4. Id at 651.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
6. Ku Klux Act of 1871 § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982)).
7. See I B. SCHWARTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS 591-93 (1970); see generally S. REP. No. I, 42d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1871) (Senate debates on the Ku Klux Act); H.R. REP. No. 1, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. (1871)
(House debates on the Ku Klux Act).
[Vol. 20:1I
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CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
tions expressed in Marbury and Owen. Concluding that the Court has
construed the remedial language in a way which renders these rights
worthless, suggestions are offered to transform Section 1983 into a
meaningful remedy that protects priceless constitutional rights.
II. SUITS AGAINST INDIVIDUAL OFFICERS OF A STATE OR
MUNICIPALITY
A. Rebirth of Section 1983
Although Section 1983 was enacted in 1871, it was generally inef-
fective in securing redress for rights violations8 until 1961 when the
Supreme Court decision of Monroe v. Pape9 brought the remedy into
view. The Court expanded the reach of Section 1983 in two ways. The
term "under color of" law was interpreted broadly to inchide actions
taken under pretense of law instead of an extremely narrow view which
would have limited the scope of the statute to acts affirmatively sanc-
tioned by the law of the state.'° Relying on a previous interpretation of
parallel language in the federal criminal statutes, the Court concluded
that Section 1983 extends to state officials misusing their official posi-
tion. I The Court also held that the existence of state law remedies for
rights violations did not preclude a federal civil suit for damages under
Section 1983.2 The promise of Monroe as an effective federal civil
remedy' 3 thus serves as a backdrop for discussion of subsequent
Supreme Court opinions that construe and apply Section 1983.
B. Under Color of State Law
A limited number of cases calling for further interpretation of the
"under color of" language in Section 1983 have come to the Supreme
Court since the Monroe decision. In Dennis v. Sparks, 4 the Court was
faced with a claim against a state judge and others who allegedly con-
8. See, e.g., Egan v. City of Aurora, 275 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1960), modified, 365 U.S. 514
(1961); Simmons v. Whitaker, 252 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1958); Agnew v. City of Compton, 239 F.2d
226 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 959 (1957).
9. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
10. The plaintiff alleged in part that Chicago police officers broke into his home without a
search warrant, destroyed personal property, arrested him without an arrest warrant, and subse-
quently denied him access to an attorney. The defendants argued that such conduct could not be
considered "under color of law" because it would have violated Illinois law. Id at 172.
11. Id
12. Id at 183.
13. See The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HARV. L. REv. 40, 213 (1961).
14. 449 U.S. 24 (1980).
1984]
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spired to deprive the plaintiff of federally secured rights through the
issuance of a state court injunction.'5 The federal district court had
ruled that the state judge was immune from Section 1983 suit, and the
case against the other defendants was dismissed because they were not
public officials acting under color of state law.' 6 The district court's
holding that private citizens could not exercise state authority by alleg-
edly bribing a state judge was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit.'7 In affirming the circuit court's decision, the Supreme
Court stated:
Of course, merely resorting to the courts and being on the winning
side of a lawsuit does not make a party a co-conspirator or a joint
actor with the judge. But here the allegations were that an official act
of the defendant judge was the product of a corrupt conspiracy in-
volving bribery of the judge. Under these allegations, the private
parties conspiring with the judge were acting under color of state
law; and it is of no consequence in this respect that the judge himself
is immune from damages liability. Immunity does not change the
character of the judge's action or that of his co-conspirators.
Thus private parties who act in concert with a state official using state
authority to commit a constitutional rights violation may not escape the
consequences of their actions simply by claiming absence of state au-
thority in their own right. Liability is imposed upon the private parties
even if the state official is completely immune from liability by virtue
of an official position.
While Dennis expanded the scope of Section 1983, the Court has
not allowed the remedy in all instances. The Court held that the de-
fendant had not acted under color of law in Polk County v. Dodson.' 9
A criminal defendant brought a Section 1983 action against a public
defender who had represented the defendant in a state criminal appeal.
The Supreme Court concluded that a public defender does not act
under color of state law when performing traditional legal services for a
defendant in a criminal proceeding, even though the public defender is
a full-time public employee of the county.2" The Court noted that a
15. The injunction prohibited the production of oil on leases owned by Sparks. After a state
appellate court dissolved the injunction, Sparks filed a Section 1983 action claiming that the lost
production was a deprivation of property without due process of law. Id at 25-26.
16. Id at 26. The defendants named in the suit were Duval County Ranch Company, its sole
owner, and two individual sureties on the injunction bond.
17. Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d 976, 983 (5th Cir. 1979), atd, 449 U.S. 24
(1980).
18. 449 U.S. at 28.
19. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
20. Id at 325.
[Vol. 20:1
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public defender is like any other lawyer in terms of the lawyer-client
relationship.2' Mere employment by the state was insufficient to estab-
lish that the public defender should be subject to Section 1983
liability.22
The Dodson court distinguished O'Connor v. Donaldson13 and Es-
telle v. Gamble,24 two cases involving state-employed prison physicians
who were sued under Section 1983 concerning treatment of persons in
state custody. In both cases, the majority concluded that the defen-
dants were engaged in administrative duties as well as in the physician-
patient relationship.25 These additional responsibilities precluded a
duty of undivided loyalty to the patient.2 6 The public defender, who is
obligated to defend the client and to enter into an adversary relation-
ship against the prosecution in the context of the American criminal
justice system, simply is not in the same situation.
C. Relationshp of Section 1983 to State Remedies
Monroe pointed toward an exception to the general rule that state
administrative remedies must be exhausted before the federal court will
entertain a Section 1983 claim.2 7 The Court articulated this exception
in Patsy v. Board of Regents,28 a case involving an employment dis-
crimination claim. The Court's decision to permit a Section 1983 claim
prior to exhaustion of state administrative remedies was based on cases
which stressed the independent nature of the federal remedy29 and the
21. The defendant's obligations as a lawyer were unrelated to state authority:
From the moment of her appointment, [the Section 1983 defendant] became Dodson's
lawyer, and Dodson became [her] client. Except for the source of payment, their rela-
tionship became identical to that existing between any other lawyer and client. "Once a
lawyer has undertaken the representation of the accused, the duties and obligations are
the same whether the lawyer is privately retained, appointed or serving in a legal aid or
defender program."
Id at 318 (quoting STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-3.9 (1980).
The Court also rejected arguments that the employment status of the public defender made
her materially different from other attorneys. The Court did note, however, that a public defender
could properly be sued under Section 1983 for acting under color of law in areas unrelated to the
lawyer-client relationship. Id at 324-25 (citing Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980)).
22. 454 U.S. at 319.
23. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
24. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
25. 454 U.S. at 320.
26. Id
27. As no state administrative remedy existed, the Monroe Court only resolved the question
of whether a plaintiff must exhaust state judicial remedies.
28. 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
29. See id at 500-01.
19841
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legislative history of Section 1983.30 It was also noted that when Con-
gress imposed limited administrative exhaustion restrictions for pris-
oner-initiated Section 1983 actions,3' it did not go further to impose
general rules for exhaustion of state administrative remedies prior to
the filing of a federal civil rights remedies case.32 Congress therefore
had made a policy decision not to impose an administrative remedies
exhaustion rule in other types of Section 1983 cases.33 The Court de-
clined to judicially alter the rule in the face of congressional action.34
If such a rule to require exhaustion of administrative remedies is forth-
coming, it will be through the legislative and not the judicial process.
Notwithstanding the Monroe and Palsy decisions, state law can
have an impact on the conduct of Section 1983 litigation. A provision
of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 requires reference to state laws in certain circum-
stances if federal statutes are not precisely adapted to providing a rem-
edy.35 Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have applied a state
survivorship statute to defeat a Section 1983 claim in Robertson v.
Wegmann, 36 a state statute of limitations and state rules for the tolling
of that statute to defeat a claim in Board of Regents v. Tomanio,3 and a
Puerto Rico statute of limitations to keep a claim alive in Chardon v.
Solo .38 Reference to state law was necessary in these instances because
30. See id at 502-07.
31. The limitation states:
[I]n any action brought pursuant to section 1983 of this title by an adult convicted of a
crime confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility, the court shall, if the
court believes that such a requirement would be appropriate and in the interests ofjus-
tice, continue such case for a period of not to exceed ninety days in order to require
exhaustion of such plain, speedy, and effective administrative remedies as are available.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1) (1982).
32. 457 U.S. at 509.
33. Id at 510-12.
34. Id at 512.
35. The statute provides in relevant part:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by the
provisions of this Title, and of Title "CIVIL RIGHTS," and of Title "CRIMES," for the
protection of all persons in the United States and their civil rights, and for their vindica-
tion, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so
far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are
not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable
remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by
the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of sueh
civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution
and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial
and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of punish-
ment on the party found guilty.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
36. 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
37. 446 U.S. 478 (1980).
38. 103 S. Ct. 2611 (1983).
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the federal statutory law did not deal with the points in question. How-
ever, it should be understood that these decisions were based on Sec-
tion 1988 and do not indicate a judicial retreat from the principles set
forth in Monroe and Patsy.
D. Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel
The application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel39 to Section
1983 claims was first addressed by the Court in Allen v. McCurry.
4 1
The Court concluded that a Section 1983 action against police officers
for an alleged unconstitutional search and seizure could not be enter-
tained by the federal district court when the state trial court had denied
a motion to suppress evidence on fourth and fourteenth amendment
grounds during a preliminary hearing."a The defendant's appeal to the
state appellate court had been unsuccessful,42 and the Supreme Court's
decision in Stone v. Powell43 prevented consideration of a habeas
corpus proceeding by a federal district court.44 Writing for the major-
ity, Justice Stewart concluded that the collateral estoppel defense was
available to the police officers who were named as defendants in the
Section 1983 action, and that the unavailability of a habeas corpus
remedy did not preclude the defense.45 Thus the doctrine of collateral
estoppel may be invoked in Section 1983 cases if a state court has made
a determination concerning an alleged constitutional wrong, the deter-
mination was adverse to the claim of the plaintiff in the subsequent
Section 1983 action, and a full opportunity was available to litigate the
issue.
A strong dissent was written by Justice Blackmun in Allen. Joined
by Justices Brennan and Marshall, he argued that the approach
adopted by the majority undermined the rationale of Section 1983 as
39. Collateral estoppel or issue preclusion is a doctrine of efficiency. Once an issue of fact or
law is actually litigated in a court of competent jurisdiction and the determination was essential to
the judgment, the determination is binding on the parties in a subsequent proceeding. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982); 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4416 (1981).
40. 449 U.S. 90 (1980). The Court's most recent treatment of collateral estoppel in a Section
1983 case is Migra v. Warren City School Dist., 104 S. Ct. 892 (1984). Migra is discussed infra
notes 162-69 and accompanying text.
41. 449 U.S. at 104.
42. See State v. McCurry, 587 S.W.2d 337 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979), aj'd, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
43. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
44. 449 U.S. at 91.
45. Id at 105. For an analysis of the interplay of class action suits and damage actions, see
Bodensteiner, Application of Preclusion Principles to Section 1983 Damage Actions After a Success-
ful Class Actionfor Equitable Relief, 16 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 977 (1983).
1984]
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interpreted in Monroe because the state court determination was made
binding on the federal judiciary." The minority also urged that the
rationale for the Section 1983 remedy is completely different from that
of the exclusionary rule.47 Because the exclusionary rule was the basis
for the state courts' rulings,48 and for the decision in Stone v. Powell,4 9
the dissenters argued that the separate federal court remedy in a suit
for money damages against the police officers under Section 1983 was
proper.50
E. Every Person
Although Monroe was the fountainhead for the increase in civil
rights damages suits in the past two decades, the Court did not consider
the scope of possible defendants under Section 1983. Subsequent
Supreme Court decisions have refused to extend liability to all persons
involved in the rights violations. These decisions effectively limit the
utility of the remedy by eliminating a source for recovery of money
damages. Even though the statutory wording purports to render liable
"every person" who violates federal rights under color of state law,"1
the Supreme Court has been unwilling to give full force to those words.
Instead the Court has adhered to common law immunities which place
certain governmental officials completely beyond the reach of the Sec-
tion 1983 remedy.
The Court in Tenney v. Brandhove52 held that state legislators were
immune from suit under Section 1983 when the challenged action was
a part of their legislative duties. 3 In Pierson v. Ray, 4 the Court
granted immunity to state court judges acting within their judicial ca-
pacity.5 5 Eleven years later the Supreme Court reaffirmed its commit-
ment to total immunity for state judges in Slump v. Sparkman.56 The
defendant judge in Stump had ordered the sterilization of a fifteen year
46. 449 U.S. at 110.
47. Id. at 106.
48. See State v. McCurry, 587 S.W.2d 337,341 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979), aJ'd, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
49. 428 U.S. at 494-95.
50. 449 U.S. at 114.
51. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
52. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
53. Id at 378-79.
54. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
55. Id at 553.
56. 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
[Vol. 20:1I
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old girl at the request of her mother. 7 When the plaintiff learned of
the true nature of the surgery two years later, she filed suit against the
judge.58 The Court refused to narrow the concept of judicial immunity
in Section 1983 actions and held that the judge was immune from dam-
ages liability. 9 In a strident dissent, three justices argued that "what
Judge Stump did. . was beyond the pale of anything that could sen-
sibly be called a judicial act."60
Even when a judge is involved in criminal conduct on the bench,
the immunity defense is available to defeat a Section 1983 action for
money damages. In Dennis v. Sparks,61 the Supreme Court noted that
judicial immunity for civil liability is complete even when the allega-
tions include criminal conspiracy on the part of the judge.62 Therefore,
as long as a judicial act is within the jurisdiction of the court, no dam-
ages remedy exists under Section 1983 against the culpable state court
judge.63
57. The mother alleged in her petition that the daughter was retarded and sexually active.
Thus sterilization was necessary to prevent "unfortunate circumstances." Id at 351.
58. The plaintiff also named her mother, the mother's attorney, the doctors who performed
the operation, and the hospital. Id. at 353.
59. Id at 364. The Stump decision has been severely criticized. See Nagel, Judicial Immunity
and Sovereignty, 6 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 237 (1978): Rosenberg, Stump v. Sparkman: The Doc-
trine of Judicial Impunity, 64 VA. L. REv. 833 (1978).
For a proposal limiting liability for judicial misconduct written in response to the Stump
decision, see Note, Judicial Immunity and Judicial Misconduct: A Proposalfor Limited Liability, 20
ARIZ. L. REv. 549 (1978). This article recounts a number of examples of judicial misconduct
which are both shocking and beyond the scope of compensatory relief. The author proposes that
the absolute immunity from liability in damages now available to judges should be shifted to a
qualified good faith immunity similar to that available to executive officials. It is suggested that
such a change will have to come through legislative action. The author proposes the use of a
judicial discipline commission as the finder of fact in such suits.
Even with the broad scope ofjudicial immunity sanctioned by the court in Stump, limits on
judicial power do exist. See, e.g., Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1978). The Court of
Appeals upheld an award of $80,000 in compensatory damages and $60,000 in punitive damages
against a judge who ordered a coffee vendor brought before him in handcuffs when he was an-
noyed with the taste of a cup of coffee. The judge also verbally threatened the vendor with addi-
tional retribution. Id at 53-54.
60. 435 U.S. at 365.
61. 449 U.S. 24 (1980).
62. Id at 31.
63. In a surprising departure from its previously unbroken line of decisions protecting judges
from suits under Section 1983, the Supreme Court recently concluded that state court judges could
be required to pay the attorneys' fees of successful Section 1983 plaintiffs who obtained federal
injunctive relief against judicial actions which constituted federal rights violations. In Pulliam v.
Allen, 104 S. Ct. 1970 (1984), a five-member majority found that the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) was intended to provide awards of attorneys' fees to success-
ful civil rights plaintiffs even if the defendants are immune from awards of money damages. 104
S. Ct. at 1982.
The Pulliam decision is also important in that it recognizes for the first time the possibility of
relief under Section 1983 against judges acting in their official capacity. While the absolute bar-
9
Spurrier: Federal Constitutional Rights: Priceless or Worthless: Awards of
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1984
TULSA LAW JOURN4L [Vol. 20:1
The common law immunity preserved for judges in Section 1983
disputes was extended to state prosecutors in Imbler v. Pachiman.64
The Section 1983 plaintiff alleged that a California deputy district at-
torney knowingly used false testimony and suppressed material evi-
dence in a criminal case." Such deliberate perversions of the
adversary process would clearly constitute a denial of due process of
law under the fourteenth amendment as interpreted in Napue v. Illi-
nois6 6 and Brady v. Maryland.67 Still, the Court opted for preservation
of absolute immunity of prosecutors from civil suits for actions taken
within their traditional duties.68 Justice Powell reasoned that potential
civil liability could deflect the prosecutor's energy away from his public
duties and make him timid in the execution of those duties. 69 The
Court also expressed concern that fear of civil liability might lead a
prosecutor to be overly cautious in presenting evidence to the jury.70
While the federal criminal law analog to Section 198371 serves as a
deterrent to such conduct, this statute provides no compensation to the
victim.
The problem of perjured testimony arose again in Briscoe v. La-
Hue.72 Following a conviction in a state criminal case, the defendant
filed a civil suit against police officers who were alleged to have given
rier against suits for money damages remains in place, the holdings in Pulliam have made it more
likely that judges will find themselves appearing as defendants in future Section 1983 actions.
64. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
65. Id at 414.
66. 360 U.S. 264 (1959). The prosecutor in Napue promised the defendant's accomplice that
he would recommend a reduced sentence in exchange for the accomplice's testimony against the
defendant. The accomplice denied any such arrangement during the defendant's trial and the
prosecutor failed to correct the false testimony. Id. at 265.
67. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Defense counsel in Brady requested statements made by the defend-
ant's accomplice. Although several statements were provided, the prosecutor withheld a statement
in which the accomplice admitted the homicide. Id at 84.
68. 424 U.S. at 430. The Court reserved the question of whether the immunity extended to
administrative and investigative duties. Id at 430-31.
69. Id at 425-26.
70. Id at 426.
71. The criminal statute worded similarly to Section 1983 states:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully
subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the
United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such in-
habitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the
punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more than $I,000 or imprisoned not more than
one year, or both; and if death results shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of
years or for life.
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1982).
72. 103 S. Ct. 1108 (1983).
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perjured testimony which led to the criminal conviction.73 The Court
continued to find exceptions to the "every person" language of Section
1983 and refused to impose liability against the officers.74 The majority
opinion began with a treatment of private witnesses' status in criminal
trials, asserting that their testimony did not give them under color of
law status, and that Anglo-American legal history provided immunity
from civil suit for persons who had served as witnesses in criminal
cases.75 Turning to the testimony of police officers in criminal trials,
the Court then traced the history of the immunity cases surrounding
the judicial process. 76 Both perspectives led to the conclusion that po-
lice officers are immune from civil liability for the testimony they give
in criminal cases, even if that testimony is perjured.77
While a public defender performing the normal duties of defense
counsel does not act under color of law,78 an allegation of conspiracy
involving a public defender and other state officials is sufficient to state
a cause of action under Section 1983. Speaking for a unanimous
Supreme Court in Tower v. Glover,7 9 Justice O'Connor concluded that
there is no exception to the statutory remedy when the defendant is a
public defender alleged to have intentionally violated the plaintiffs
federal rights."0 While noting that several exceptions to Section 1983
liability had been recognized in the past, the Court found nothing in
the common law background of the statute to justify an additional ex-
ception for public defenders whose intentional actions led to constitu-
tional rights deprivations.
The office of public defender did not exist in 1871 when the prede-
cessor of Section 1983 was enacted by Congress; however, English bar-
risters in the nineteenth century, like public defenders, could not
choose their own clients.8" The Court decided to follow the English
approach to barrister liability which granted immunity for negligent
conduct but not intentional misconduct.8 2 In the few state court deci-
sions involving public defender liability, Justice O'Connor found none
73. Id at 1111.
74. Id at 1121.
75. Id at 1113-15.
76. Id at 1115-16.
77. Id at 1118.
78. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). Dodson is discussed supra notes
19-26 and accompanying text.
79. 104 S. Ct. 2820 (1984).
80. Id. at 2826.
81. Id. at 2825.
82. Id.
1984]
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that allowed the immunity defense when the action was intentional.83
Thus nothing in the legislative history of Section 1983 or its English or
American corollaries supported the exemption claimed by the public
defenders.
The defendants also asserted that public defenders, like prosecu-
tors, have resonsibilities to the judicial system which may be seriously
impaired by the threat of frivolous lawsuits.84 It was argued that these
lawsuits could lead to an inability of the state to meet the constitutional
requirement of providing defense counsel to indigent criminal defend-
ants. The Court responded that any relief should come from Congress
and not the judiciary.8"
It is apparent that the Court is willing to provide the full scope of
the Section 1983 remedy in the case of intentional misconduct by pub-
lic defenders. When the Section 1983 claims are groundless, federal
district court judges should render summary judgment for the defend-
ants so as not to subject the public defender to harassment by disgrun-
tled state prisoners who may be prone to litigate meritless claims. If
Tower leads to a flood of prisoner-initiated suits, one can anticipate
calls for relief from the public defenders to the courts or Congress.
The Supreme Court's interpretation of "every person" thus con-
tains major exceptions to the literal wording of Section 1983. State
legislators acting within the traditional scope of their legislative duties,
and state court judges acting within the broadest scope of their jurisdic-
tion possess absolute immunity from suit for money damages under the
statute. Similarly, freedom from Section 1983 liability extends to pros-
ecutors, insofar as their discretionary decisions in prosecuting a crimi-
nal defendant, and police officers when the alleged constitutional
wrong is based on testimony given in a criminal trial. No matter how
flagrantly the victim's rights have been violated, these state officials can
83. Id at 2826 & n.5.
84. Id at 2826.
85. The Court stated:
Petitioners' concerns may be well founded, but the remedy petitioners urge is not for
us to adopt. We do not have a license to establish immunities from § 1983 actions in the
interests of what we judge to be sound public policy. It is for Congress to determine
whether § 1983 litigation has become too burdensome to state or federal institutions and,
if so, what remedial action is appropriate.
Id
The majority suggested in dictum that the abstention doctrine might provide relief when a
plaintiffhad already advanced the claim in a previous state court proceeding. Id. In a concurring
opinion, Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens indicated that this issue was not
properly before the Court and therefore should not be addressed. Id. at 2827.
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rest assured that a Section 1983 action for money damages against
them cannot prevail. For the person who has sustained the constitu-
tional wrong, there is no constitutional remedy to recover money dam-
ages from these types of offending officials under Section 1983, even
though the offenders have unquestionably acted under color of state
law.
F. Quaifled Good Faith Immunity Defense
While legislators, judges, prosecutors and witnesses enjoy com-
plete immunity from suit, immunity for police officers and other indi-
viduals has been less generously received by the Supreme Court in
Section 1983 suits seeking money damages. The Court in Pierson v.
Ra, 86 concluded that police officers were not charged with the duty of
predicting the future course of constitutional interpretation and were
therefore entitled to a good faith immunity defense in a suit based on
the officer's enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.8 7 Subsequent
decisions in Scheuer v. Rhodes88 and Wood v. Strickland 9 reduced the
strength of the good faith defense as outlined in Pierson and opened a
greater opportunity for recovery by a plaintiff seeking damages for a
constitutional wrong.
Scheuer and Wood resulted in the development of a qualified good
faith immunity defense based on a reasonable belief held by the offi-
cials at the time of the alleged constitutional violation. The Wood
opinion formulated the test as follows:
Therefore, in the specific context of school discipline, we hold that
a school board member is not immune from liability ... if he knew
or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his
sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights
of the student affected, or if he took the action with the malicious
intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other in-
jury to the student.90
Under this test, ignorance of the Constitution will not be adequate as a
defense against a civil suit filed under Section 1983 in all circum-
stances. However, the actual good faith of the official is not the only
consideration. Other important factors are the extent of the knowledge
of constitutional rights which the court determines that the officer pos-
86. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
87. Id at 557.
88. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
89. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
90. Id at 322.
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sessed or should have possessed at the time of the constitutional wrong,
and whether the actions of the official were based on a reasonable as-
sessment of the circumstances. At least in the case of obvious wrongs, a
recovery for damages is possible even if the officer actually believed
that his action was correct at the time. Recovery is warranted as long
as the court can conclude that the belief was not reasonable in light of
the situation, or not justified in view of what the officer should have
known about the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
The Supreme Court's belief that the qualified good faith immunity
defense is an appropriate way to balance the competing interests of
plaintiffs and defendants is also seen in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.9 While
this case was not a Section 1983 action,92 it used the case law developed
under Section 1983 as the norm for executive officer liability in cases
alleging constitutional rights deprivations. Noting that the qualified
good faith immunity approach had been adopted for federal officials in
Butz v. Economou,93 the Court concluded that the approach is the pre-
ferred manner of reconciling the interests of litigants in civil rights
cases.94 In a companion case to Harlow, the Court held in Nixon v.
Fitzgerald95 that the President of the United States is completely im-
mune from civil suits seeking damages for constitutional wrongs he
may have committed.96 The majority concluded that the President, un-
like governors and other state officials in the executive branch, may not
be sued for constitutional rights violations under any circumstances.97
Although the Nixon case does not have a direct bearing on Section
1983 actions,98 it does create an additional exception to the opportuni-
ties for individuals to collect money damages against government offi-
cials who commit constitutional wrongs.
91. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
92. Plaintiff alleged that a right to damages for wrongful discharge could be inferred by two
federal statutes which protected governmental employees who furnished information to members
of Congress. Id at 805 & n. 10.
93. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
94. The public officials' interests include the adverse impact upon the operation of the gov-
ernment office and the costs of litigating subjective intent. 457 U.S. at 816-17.
95. 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
96. Id at 749. Fitzgerald claimed that he was dismissed from his job as an Air Force man-
agement analyst in retaliation for congressional subcommittee testimony that was adverse to the
Department of Defense. President Richard Nixon allegedly participated in a conspiracy to dis-
charge Fitzgerald. Id at 740 & n.19.
97. Id at 749-50.
98. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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G. Conduct Which Imposes Liability
Assuming that the qualified good faith immunity standard is the
appropriate one to apply in claims against state executive-branch offi-
cials acting under color of law, the question arises as to the level of
culpability necessary to negate the qualified good faith defense. 99 This
is an issue which has confronted the Supreme Court in three separate
cases without satisfactory resolution.
InProcunier v. Navarette," the Court granted certiorari to resolve
the negligence question but concluded that no "clearly established"
constitutional right had been violated by the defendant state prison of-
ficials.'°' Because the officials could not reasonably have been expected
to anticipate future developments in the constitutional rights of prison-
ers, they were entitled to use the qualified good faith immunity de-
fense.' By deciding the case on a lack of clearly established rights,
the Court found it unnecessary to deal with the negligence question.1"3
The Court tried to reach the issue in Baker v. McCollan,'°4 but was
unsuccessful because it again found that no constitutional rights viola-
tion had occurred.' In reaching this conclusion, Justice Rehnquist
noted that the negligence issue may be more complex than it first
appears:
Having been around this track once before in Procunier ... we
have come to the conclusion that the question of whether an allega-
tion of simple negligence is sufficient to state a cause of action under
§ 1983 is more elusive than it appears at first blush. It may well not
be susceptible of a uniform answer across the entire spectrum of con-
ceivable constitutional violations which might be the subject of a
§ 1983 action. In any event, before the relationship between the de-
fendant's state of mind and his liability under § 1983 can be mean-
ingfully explored, it is necessary to isolate the precise constitutional
violation with which he is charged. . . . If there has been no such
deprivation, the state of mind of the defendant is wholly
immaterial.
10 6
99. Section 1983 is silent as to the mental state required to commit a deprivation of civil
rights. See supra note 5 (current text of Section 1983).
100. 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
101. Id at 564.
102. The plaintiff, an inmate of a state prison, alleged that prison officials refused to mail his
letters during 197 1-72. Prisoner mailing privileges were not recognized as a first amendment right
until 1974. Id at 563-65.
103. Id at 566 n.14.
104. 443 U.S. 137 (1979).
105. Id at 146-47.
106. Id at 139-40.
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Of course it is arguable that this discussion of a variable standard of
liability in different situations is only dictum because the Court con-
cluded that no rights violation had been committed.
Recognizing the frustration of attorneys and lower court judges
confronted with the opinions of Procunier and Baker, Justice
Rehnquist attempted to address the issue in Parratt v. Taylor. °7 In
what appeared to be a prisoner's attempt to turn the federal district
court into a small claims court, the plaintiff sought to recover $23.50 for
hobby supplies lost by prison officials.108 The prisoner alleged that the
loss was a deprivation of property without due process of law. 10 9 Jus-
tice Rehnquist noted that the lower courts had adopted varying stan-
dards as to negligence-based Section 1983 liability without much help
from the Supreme Court, and then proceeded to consider the language
and history of the statute:
Nothing in the language of § 1983 or its legislative history limits
the statute solely to intentional deprivations of constitutional rights.
In Baker v. McCollan. . . we suggested that simply because a wrong
was negligently as opposed to intentionally committed did not fore-
close the possibility that such action could be brought under
§ 1983. . . . Section 1983, unlike its criminal counterpart, 18 U.S.C.
§ 242, has never been found by this Court to contain a state-of-mind
requirement ...
Both Baker v. McCollan and Monroe v. Pape suggest that § 1983
affords a "civil remedy" for deprivations of federally protected rights
caused by persons acting under color of state law without any express
requirement of a particular state of mind. Accordingly, in any
§ 1983 action the initial inquiry must focus on whether the two essen-
tial elements to a § 1983 action are present: (1) whether the conduct
complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state
law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States." o
The negligence question was bypassed again because the Court con-
cluded that property loss which may have been caused by negligence
on the part of the prison officials was not a violation of the plaintiffs
fourteenth amendment due process rights."'
107. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
108. Id at 529. The federal district court possessed subject matter jurisdiction because the
statute which authorizes the federal district courts to hear damage claims for deprivation of civil
rights does not have a minimum dollar amount. See 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982).
109. 451 U.S. at 530.
110. Id at 534-35.
111. The Court found that the deprivation was not a result of an established state procedure,
but occurred because the officials failed to follow the established procedure. Id. at 543. For a
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Thus the negligence discussion again would appear susceptible to
classification as dictum given the failure of the plaintiff to cross the
constitutional wrong threshold specifically required for a successful
Section 1983 action. Although the Court has not yet specifically ruled
on the standard necessary to impose Section 1983 liability, these three
decisions indicate that a negligence standard may at least be permissi-
ble in some circumstances, and that Section 1983 should not be inter-
preted to contain the strict requirement of intentional infliction of harm
before liability may be imposed for violation of constitutional rights.
III. MEASURE OF DAMAGES IN SECTION 1983 SUITS
A plaintiff who can prove a violation of his or her constitutional
rights and avoid the immunities discussed above is entitled to an award
of damages under Section 1983. The question then becomes one of
assessing the measure of damages which may be awarded in Section
1983 suits. Two relatively recent decisions of the Supreme Court shed
light on this matter. In Carey v. Pijhus,"2 students who had been sus-
pended from school claimed a denial of procedural due process guar-
anteed by the fourteenth amendment." 3 When the trial court found a
constitutional wrong but refused to award money damages, the success-
ful Section 1983 plaintiffs appealed. The Seventh Circuit disagreed
with the district court's disposition of the damages question and held
that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover substantial nonpunitive dam-
ages without proof of any actual injury other than deprivation of their
federal due process rights." 4 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
consider the appropriate measure of damages in Section 1983 cases.
In a decision without a recorded dissent,1I5 the Court held that the
students were entitled to recover only nominal damages in the absence
of proof of actual injury."I6 The Court rejected the plaintiffs' assertion
that damages should be awarded simply because constitutional rights
had been violated." 7 The Court also disagreed with the claim that
every deprivation of procedural due process should lead to a presump-
critique of the Parrat decision, see Friedman, Parratt v. Taylor. Opening and Closing the Door on
Section 1983, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 545 (1982).
112. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
113. Id at 250.
114. See Piphus v. Carey, 545 F.2d 30, 32 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
115. Justice Marshall concurred in the result without filing an opinion. Justice Blacknun did
not participate in the decision.
116. 435 U.S. at 266.
117. Id. at 264.
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tion of some injury which would relieve the plaintiff from proving ac-
tual injury."1 8 Looking to the records surrounding congressional
enactment of Section 1983, the Court found no indication of an intent
to create an additional element beyond that inherent in any award of
compensatory damages."19 The Court also was unwilling to accept the
plaintiffs' contention that damages should automatically flow from
every deprivation of procedural due process:
[A]lthough mental and emotional distress caused by the denial of
procedural due process itself is compensable under § 1983, we hold
that neither the likelihood of such injury nor the difficulty of proving
it is so great as to justify awarding compensatory damages without
proof that such injury actually was caused.' 21
Immediately following this passage, the Court stated that it was not
imposing a blanket rule for all constitutional rights violations and
noted that each type of violation calls for an independent judgment. 121
This section of the Court's opinion is particularly important because it
should effectively head off attempts to cite Carey as a flat rejection of
the concept of presumed damages in all constitutional rights situations.
The Court was still faced with the fact that the plaintiffs in the case
actually had suffered a constitutional rights deprivation. For this rea-
son, it was necessary to apply the traditional common law custom of
permitting nominal damages in order to insure that rights of this type
are scrupulously observed. Nominal damages are awarded without re-
quiring proof of actual injury, but the amount is token in nature. 122
Applying this standard, the Court concluded that the deprivation of
procedural due process rights was actionable per se to the extent that
nominal damages would be recoverable without proof of injury in an
amount not to exceed one dollar. 23
The Carey decision raises grave questions about the seriousness of
the Court in effectuating the compensatory rationale contained in Sec-
tion 1983. As a practical matter, the Court has relegated the value of
constitutional rights per se to the bargain basement. An award of only
nominal damages, no matter how it is justified in terms of common law
heritage from other settings, is a judicial pronouncement that constitu-
118. Id at 262.
119. Id at 256-57.
120. Id at 264.
121. Id at 265. The Court analogized to the common law rules of damages that are defined by
the particular interest to be protected. Id. at 257-59.
122. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 907 (1939).
123. 435 U.S. at 267.
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tional rights are nearly worthless. To achieve a substantial award of
damages, the successful plaintiff must prove injury above and beyond
the actual constitutional wrong. Language in the Carey opinion indi-
cating that awards for mental anguish may be made under Section 1983
when proof of such actual injury is forthcoming does nothing to dis-
guise the fact that the constitutional rights deprivation per se is going
uncompensated. At least in the setting of procedural due process viola-
tions surrounding school suspensions, the Supreme Court has failed to
give the victim of a constitutional wrong a meaningful remedy for the
violation of his or her most fundamental legal rights. 24
Smith v. Wade'25 marks a more positive development for plaintiffs
in the context of Section 1983 litigation. A state reformatory inmate
brought suit against prison guards and won a judgment of $25,000 in
compensatory damages and $5,000 in punitive damages.' 26 The judg-
ment was affirmed on appeal by the Eighth Circuit. 27 The only issue
presented to the Supreme Court was the proper standard for imposition
of punitive damages under Section 1983.
The Court indicated that the legislative history surrounding Sec-
tion 1983 offered little guidance on the measure of damages. 128 Awards
of punitive damages, however, have been a settled part of American
law in both federal and state jurisdictions. 29 The Court also noted that
while other cases had presumed the availability of punitive damages
under Section 1983 in some circumstances, the matter never had come
squarely before the Court. 3 ' Even the defendant in Smith did not
deny that punitive damages might be appropriate in some situations;
instead, he claimed they were not appropriate in the absence of the
showing of "ill will, spite, or intent to injure."''
124. Because Carey involved only procedural due process, it is possible to argue that it does
not preclude awards of substantial damages for the deprivation of substantive constitutional rights
per se. See Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 1981); Note, Herrera v. Valentine: Pre-
sumed Damages for Violations of Substantive Constitutional Rights, 28 S.D.L. REv. 221 (1982).
For an analysis suggesting that the Court misconstrued the doctrine of tort liability in the
legislative intent of Section 1983 in the Carey decision, see Love, Damages: A Remedy for the
Violation of ConstitutionalRights, 67 CAL. L. REv. 1242 (1979). See also Note, DamageAwardsfor
Constitutional Torts: A Reconsideration after Carey v. Piphus, 93 HARV. L. REV. 966 (1980) (pur-
pose of damage remedies is redress for the abridgement of constitutional rights).
125. 103 S. Ct. 1625 (1983).
126. Id at 1628.
127. Wade v. Haynes, 663 F.2d 778 (8th Cir. 1981), a]J'd, 103 S. Ct. 1625 (1983).
128. 103 S. Ct. at 1628.
129. Id at 1629 & n.3.
130. Id at 1629.
131. Id at 1628-30.
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The district court had instructed the jury that punitive damages
might be awarded if the defendant's conduct was shown to be "a reck-
less or callous disregard of, or indifference to, the rights or safety of
others ... ."132 Accepting the district court's approach, Justice Bren-
nan concluded that a showing of actual intent to cause harm is not
required under Section 1983 before an award of punitive damages is
appropriate. 133 The jury instruction in question was found to be suffi-
ciently clear to demonstrate that culpable conduct beyond ordinary
negligence is required to justify an award of punitive damages. The
Court found no risk of diminution of a deterrent effect simply because
the standard used in the jury instructions did not provide a crystal clear
definition of the level of culpability required.'34
Following an additional discussion of the law of torts surrounding
compensatory and punitive damage awards, the Court stated:
We hold that a jury may be permitted to assess punitive damages in
an action under § 1983 when the defendant's conduct is shown to be
motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or
callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others. We
further hold that this threshold applies even when the underlying
standard of liability for compensatory damages is one of
recklessness.'3!
The last sentence in the Court's holding was necessary because the
prison guard was protected from liability for mere negligent conduct as
his duties required an exercise of discretion. 136 It should not be read to
imply that recklessness is the minimal standard for compensatory dam-
ages in all circumstances, particularly in light of the Court's indications
to the contrary in the negligence-standard cases discussed above.'3 7
As a result of the line of cases beginning with Monroe and devel-
oping through Smith, it is apparent that the remedy of money damages
provided by Congress in Section 1983 provides no realistic protection
132. Id at 1628 (emphasis omitted).
133. Id at 1637.
134. The need for exceptional clarity in the standard for punitive damages arises only if
one assumes that there are substantial numbers of officers who will not be deterred by
compensatory damages; only such officers will seek to guide their conduct by the puni-
tive damages standard. The presence of such officers constitutes a powerful argument
against raising the threshold for punitive damages.
Id (emphasis in original).
135. Id at 1640.
136. Justice Brennan cited Procunier as the basis for Smith's qualified immunity status. Id. at
1639-40. A better reading of Procunier is that no "clearly established" constitutional right had
been violated at the time the action took place. Thus the qualified good faith defense was suffi-
cient to defeat the Section 1983 claim.
137. See supra notes 99-111 and accompanying text.
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to the victim of constitutional rights deprivations. The immunities of-
fered to certain state officials and the limitations on damage awards for
constitutional wrongs per se emasculate Section 1983. Even when
damages are awarded, the problem of the judgment-proof individual
remains. Collection of the award may not be a realistic possibility due
to an absence of resources with which to satisfy the judgment. For this
reason, as well as the situations in which the individual officer is im-
mune, another source of recovery is necessary.
IV. GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES AS SECTION 1983 DEFENDANTS
Plaintiffs' attorneys in search of the proverbial deep pocket from
which to extract an award of money damages naturally look past the
often poorly paid state and local governmental employees to gaze
fondly at the public purse as a source of payment for damages. Monroe
held that a municipal government was not the proper defendant under
Section 1983,138 but the Court read the legislative history of the statute
in 1978 to reach the opposite conclusion in Monell v. Department of
Social Services.' 9 The Court chose to impose liability against the mu-
nicipal government when the rights violations were a matter of public
policy or custom,"'4 but it refused to hold a governmental defendant
vicariously liable for the action of its individual officers under the doc-
trine of respondeat superior.' 4 ' The decision to overrule Monroe thus
opened the door of the federal courthouse to suits for money damages
against the deep pocket of the governmental treasury, at least in the
case of "public policy or custom" violations of federal rights.'42
Monell revealed that the Court was unwilling to impose liability
on the governmental units for every action of their employees. Rejec-
tion of the respondeat superior approach clearly indicated that most
cases involving constitutional rights violations would not tap the public
treasury for money damages. Monell left undecided the question of
whether the governmental unit would be able to make use of the im-
138. 365 U.S. at 191.
139. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
140. Id at 694.
141. Id at 663 n.7.
142. One commentator has asserted that Congress meant to impose a "duty of protection" of
civil rights on municipal governments rather than simply providing for liability for official policy
misfeasance. Note, Municioal Liability under Section 1983: The Meaning of "'olicy or Custom",
79 COLUhi. L. REV. 304, 315 (1979). Contra Note, Section 1983 Municipal Liability and the Doc-
trine of Respondeat Superior, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 935 (1979) (municipal entities should not be
liable on respondeat superior grounds). For a thorough analysis of the implications of the Monell
decision, see Schnapper, Civil Rights Afler Monell, 79 COLuM. L. REv. 213 (1979).
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munity defenses available to its officers. The Supreme Court answered
this question in Owen v. City of Independence, Missouri.I43
The Court was faced with a situation in which the individual of-
ficer defendants who had dismissed a municipal employee without due
process were able to assert a qualified good faith immunity defense; the
governmental entity also claimed the qualified good faith immunity de-
fense. On the facts of the case, there was no doubt that the dismissal
constituted an action of city policy rather than an isolated act of a mu-
nicipal employee."' The question left open in Monell now required an
answer.
Beginning with the statutory language of Section 1983, Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority, noted that there is no provision for
immunity of any defendant in the precise wording of the law.14  The
judicially created exceptions for legislators, judges, and others were
based on common law precedents and the reasons behind them. 46 The
Court then refused to extend the qualified good faith defense to gov-
ernmental entities. 47
The majority opinion noted that suits against municipal corpora-
tions were common at the time Section 1983 was enacted, and appar-
ently there was no general approach granting a good faith immunity to
a municipality. 48 Justice Brennan also discounted separation of pow-
ers concerns in the state courts as inapplicable when a federal court was
reviewing a policy decision already made and implemented by the gov-
ernmental unit. 149 The Court then summarized the advantages of the
decision:
We believe that today's decision, together with prior precedents
in this area, properly allocates these costs among the three principals
143. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
144. Owen was acting as the Independence Chief of Police when allegations of improper han-
dling of property in the police property room surfaced. In a regularly scheduled meeting, the City
Council of Independence authorized the City Manager to take direct action against anyone who
had been involved in the impropriety. Pursuant to this directive, the City Manager discharged
Owen from his duties. Id at 627-29.
145. Id at 635.
146. Id at 637-38.
147. The Court concluded that:
[T]here is no tradition of immunity for municipal corporations, and neither history nor
policy supports a construction of § 1983 that would justify the qualified immunity ac-
corded the city of Independence by the Court of Appeals. We hold, therefore, that the
municipality may not assert the good faith of its officers or agents as a defense to liability
under § 1983.
Id at 638.
148. Id at 639-40.
149. Id at 648.
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in the scenario of the § 1983 cause of action: the victim of the consti-
tutional deprivation; the officer whose conduct caused the injury; and
the public, as represented by the municipal entity. The innocent in-
dividual who is harmed by an abuse of governmental authority is
assured that he will be compensated for his injury. The offending
official, so long as he conducts himself in good faith, may go about
his business secure in the knowledge that a qualified immunity will
protect him from personal liability for damages that are more appro-
priately chargeable to the populace as a whole. And the public will
be forced to bear only the costs of injury inflicted by the "execution
of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers
or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent offi-
cial policy." '
Thus the five-justice majority in Owen attempted to allocate the burden
of liability for constitutional rights violations among the victim, the of-
ficer and the governmental unit involved.
Once the Court had decided that governmental entities could be
adjudged liable for compensatory damages, the next question to be de-
termined was the appropriateness of assessing punitive damages in
suits against governmental defendants. The issue was presented to the
Court in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. 151 Following a wrongful
revocation of an entertainment license one day prior to a scheduled
rock concert, the promoter subsequently filed a Section 1983 action
against the City of Newport and its officials. 152 The jury returned sub-
stantial verdicts for both compensatory and punitive damages.153 The
awards were affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. 54
In the analytical framework typical of Section 1983 decisions, the
Court discussed the legislative history of Section 1983 and cases which
had construed it.' 5 5 The Court also reviewed the general tendency of
courts throughout the United States to disallow punitive damages
against municipalities.' 56 Fearful that awards of punitive damages
150. Id at 657.
151. 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
152. The license was revoked because the Newport City Council thought that the promoter
had engaged a "rock" band to play at the concert. The city objected because it felt that the band
would attract a boisterous audience. Plaintiffs complaint alleged that the license cancellation was
a form of censorship. Id at 250-52.
153. Compensatory damages totalled $72,910 and punitive damages totalled $275,000. Id at
253.
154. Fact Concerts, Inc. v. City of Newport, 626 F.2d 1060 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated, 453 U.S.
247 (1981).
155. 453 U.S. at 263-66.
156. Id at 259-63.
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would threaten financial stability of local governments, - 7 the Court re-
fused to permit punitive damages against governmental entities in a
Section 1983 case.158
The victim of a constitutional wrong now has a chance to recover
damages from municipal corporations as long as the harm suffered can
be characterized as the result of some official policy or custom em-
braced by the local government. While individual defendants may es-
cape personal liability via the immunity defense, the municipal
government cannot make use of that defense to protect the public treas-
ury. Although the decisions of Monell and Owen mark a dramatic shift
of Section 1983 interpretation, they do not offer a substantial means of
redressing all constitutional wrongs. First these decisions deal only
with public policy violations of federal rights.' 59 Second a plaintiff
who can prevail on the assertion that the constitutional wrong was a
result of public policy or custom is only awarded nominal damages for
constitutional rights deprivation per se.160 An award of back pay or
compensation for consequential harms will satisfy an injured plaintiff,
but constitutional rights alone are worth no more than one dollar in
Section 1983 compensation under some circumstances. Third munici-
pal governments are not liable for punitive damages. 61 While punitive
damages remain a distinct possibility against individual officials, the
deep pocket of the public treasury cannot be tapped to recover such
awards.
The most recent decision in the area of governmental liability
under Section 1983 came in Migra v. Warren City School District.162
The question facing the Court in Migra was whether a state court judg-
ment in the plaintiffs civil suit concerning nonreappointment as a su-
pervisor of elementary education was to be given preclusive effect in
the context of a subsequent Section 1983 action brought in a federal
157. Id at 270.
158. [C]onsiderations of history and policy do not support exposing a municipality to
punitive damages for the bad-faith actions of its officials. Because absolute immunity
from such damages obtained at common law and was undisturbed by the 42d Congress,
and because that immunity is compatible with both the purposes of § 1983 and general
principles of public policy, we hold that a municipality is immune from punitive dam-
ages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Id at 271.
159. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
160. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 267 (1978).
161. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 271.
162. 104 S. Ct. 892 (1984).
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court.' 63 Citing Allen v. McCurry,"6 the Court stated: "It is now set-
tled that a federal court must give to a state-court judgment the same
preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the
state in which the judgment was rendered."'' 65  Although Allen in-
volved issues that had been specifically litigated at the state court
level,' 66 the Court did not rule on the preclusive effect of issues which
could have been raised in the state court litigation but were not in-
cluded by the plaintiff.
The Migra Court concluded that no valid reason existed to treat
the two situations differently, specifically rejecting the argument that a
less restrictive application of the preclusion doctrine was intended by a
Congress concerned with state courts' ability to protect federal
rights.' 67 Because the preclusion doctrine followed by the Court in
Migra requires the federal courts to use the same rules which would be
employed by the state courts, 68 the ultimate decision in the case was to
remand it to the Ohio courts for a determination on whether state court
rules would preclude the raising of issues which had not been initially
raised. 69
While suits against local governmental units seeking money dam-
ages are now possible under Section 1983, the same is not true when the
plaintiff seeks compensation against state governmental agencies. Al-
though the Court has held that the enforcement clause of the four-
teenth amendment permits Congress to provide for suits against the
states by appropriate legislation, 7 ' the majority has sought explicit
163. The plaintiff alleged two causes of action relating to her employment contract in the state
court action but did not allege the Section 1983 claim. After the contract claims were resolved, the
plaintiff filed a Section 1983 claim in the federal district court. The complaint alleged that her
employment termination was intended to punish her for exercising first amendment rights. Addi-
tionally plaintiff claimed denial of due process and equal protection. Id. at 895.
164. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
165. 104 S. Ct. at 896.
166. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
167. 104 S. Ct. at 897.
168. Id at 896.
169. Id at 899.
170. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1978), the Court stated:
[V]e think that the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it
embodies. . . are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment. In that section, Congress is expressly granted authority to enforce
"by appropriate legislation" the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which themselves embody significant limitations on state authority. When Congress acts
pursuant to § 5, not only is it exercising legislative authority that is plenary within the
terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising that authority under one section of a
constitutional Amendment whose other sections by their own terms embody limitations
on state authority. We think that Congress may, in determining what is "appropriate
legislation" for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment,
provide for private suits against States or state officials which are constitutionally imper-
missible in other contexts.
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congressional language for permitting such litigation.1 7 1 In the Section
1983 context, the issue then becomes whether Congress intended to
provide for suits against state governments by private plaintiffs when
the statute was adopted. In Quern v. Jordan,72 the Court reached the
conclusion that Section 1983 did not provide authority to override nor-
mal immunity of states provided by the language of the eleventh
amendment, even when injunctive relief might be available against in-
dividual state officers to prevent future harms. 73
V. IMPROVING THE SECTION 1983 REMEDY
In view of the Supreme Court decisions handed down in the last
two decades, it seems appropriate to conclude that federal constitu-
tional rights in many instances are worthless. The promises of Chief
Justice John Marshall 74 and Justice William Brennan,7- speaking for
the Supreme Court of the United States, is a hollow one. It is apparent
that ample room remains for improvement of the remedial system
available to the victim of federal constitutional rights violations which
take place at the hands of officials acting under color of law.
First, a guaranteed minimum recoverable amount in compensa-
tory damages must be established to avoid the implication of the Carey
decision that constitutional rights per se are worthless. If such a mini-
mum is not implemented, the Supreme Court will have to fashion a
Id at 456. See also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (attorneys' fees can be assessed against a
state under 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
171. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 672 (1974).
172. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
173. Id at 345. The Quern majority cited Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978) which held
that a Section 1983 suit against the state and its board of corrections was barred by the eleventh
amendment. States may be considered "persons" under Section 1983, but the eleventh amend-
ment would bar suits in federal court because Congress did not clearly remove the Amendment's
protection. The practical value of such an approach would be that plaintiffs could sue under
Section 1983 in state courts where the eleventh amendment would not be applicable. See Note,
Amenability of States to Section 1983 Suits: Reexamining Quern v. Jordan, 62 B.U.L. REV. 731,
776 (1982).
As the states are not amenable to suit under Section 1983, a court must inquire whether the
defendant governmental entity is a "state" agency or a "local" one. In Mt. Healthy City School
Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), the Court had to determine that the school
board's authority under state law was local in nature. After reviewing the Ohio statutes, the Court
concluded that "a local school board. . . is more like a county or city than it is like an arm of the
State." Id at 280. A similar issue was confronted by the Court in Lake Country Estates, Inc. v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979). The Court found that a planning agency
created by interstate compact was a proper Section 1983 defendant. Id at 402. Obviously, it is in
a plaintiff's interest to present arguments that point toward the local end of the state-local author-
ity continuum in light of the Court's interpretation of Section 1983 in Quern.
174. Supra note 2 and accompanying text.
175. Supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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jurisprudence of constitutional remedies by determining which rights
are worthy of protection. The Court will be forced to decide whether
the freedoms of religion or press receive the same treatment as that
given procedural due process. The right to equal protection in matters
of racial discrimination will be weighed and assigned a value. In es-
sence, the Court Will draw lines between those rights which are really
compensable per se and those which are not.
In order to adequately compensate a victim of a constitutional
rights deprivation and to protect governmental entities and employees
from the threat of crushing damage awards, it would be appropriate for
Congress to provide both a minimum recovery mandated by statute
and also a maximum amount recoverable for the constitutional depri-
vation per se. As a starting point, it is suggested that a minimum award
of $1,000 and a maximum award of $10,000 be established. Congress
has provided for special arrangements in the types of awards, and the
criminal law is replete with legislatively mandated minima and max-
ima when it comes to ranges of permissible sentences. 76
Second, the absolute immunity defense available to prosecutors,
judges, and legislators should be modified to provide only the qualified
good faith immunity defense available to other state and local officials.
As school board members and other state and local officials have man-
aged to survive since Monroe v. Pape,177 judges, legislators, and prose-
cutors could also withstand the added responsibility. Society's interest
in having courageous and fearless legislators, judges, and prosecutors is
an insufficient reason to grant complete immunity to these individuals
in light of the experience of other officials since the Monroe decision
176. For example, Congress has provided that the victim of an illegal interception, disclosure,
or use of wire or oral communication in violation of the federal criminal law shall be entitled to
recover "actual damages but not less than liquidated damages computed at the rate of$100 a day
for each day of violation or $1,000, whichever is higher." 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1982). Similarly, 12
U.S.C. § 1723a(e) (1982) provides for $100 per day in punitive damages for misuse of the words
"Federal National Mortgage Association" or "Government National Mortgage Association" re-
gardless of whether the plaintiff can obtain actual damages. Unjust conviction and imprisonment
also gives rise to a civil damages award against the United States in a maximum amount of $5,000.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2513(e) (1982).
Maximum fines exist in the criminal statutes also. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1982) sets a
$10,000 limit on fines for conspiracies to violate civil rights. Additionally, 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1982)
imposes a $I,000 maximum on fines for deprivation of civil rights under color of state law. Al-
though neither of these statutes provides for payment of the fine to the victim, 18 U.S.C. § 3614
(1982) allows the court in its discretion to direct that the fine of $1,000 for seafaring seduction be
paid to the mother for the benefit of the child. Why Congress was more solicitous of the needs of
unwed mothers seduced at sea than the victims of civil rights violations on dry land is not re-
corded in the legislative annals.
177. 365 U.S. at 167 (1961).
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breathed life into the Section 1983 action. Society clearly needs fear-
less judges and prosecutors, but it also wants courageous governors,
chiefs of police, and other officials in our state and local governments.
Other than the historic common law basis for the absolute immunity
defense, little rationale supports it as a basis for denying liability. Con-
gress should amend Section 1983 to provide the same level of immunity
for all state and local officials in terms of potential personal liability in
civil damages.
Third, governmental entity liability under Section 1983 should be
expanded to include liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
At present, there is a clear conflict of interest between public adminis-
trators charged with defending the municipal interest in a Section 1983
case and public employees who also have been sued in their individual
capacities in the same litigation. If the city can convince the court that
the violation took place as the result of an individual's actions and not
as a matter of official policy, the city escapes liability for compensatory
damages and shifts it to the employee. Conversely, the employee's
qualified good faith immunity defense is significantly strengthened if
he or she can demonstrate that the action taken was in conformity with
or pursuant to an official policy of the governmental entity. When the
municipality undertakes to defend its employees in civil rights litiga-
tion, there will be dangerous cross-pressures which will influence the
defense attorneys. Even if separate defense counsel are employed, the
situation is bound to undermine employee morale when it appears that
the municipal employer cannot be counted upon to support its employ-
ees' use of the qualified good faith defense in suits arising out of their
duties. To avoid the current twin perils of leaving the victim uncom-
pensated and pitting the employee against the municipal employer,
Section 1983 should be amended to provide for governmental entity
liability for most constitutional wrongs. This amendment should ex-
tend liability to the state level as well as to lower governmental units.
The stark choice offered by the Supreme Court's current interpre-
tation of the law is whether the victim or the taxpayer is to bear the
burden of a constitutional rights violation. The courts and legislatures
must choose to compensate the victim. State tort claims acts and judi-
cial decisions which abrogate the doctrine of sovereign immunity have
increased the states' tort liability over the past few decades with no
apparent destruction of state institutions. These remedies available to
plaintiffs do not provide for constitutional harms, however, because
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they are premised on putting thestate in the position of a private em-
ployer responsible for the torts of its employers by operation of the
respondeat superior doctrine. Because private employers are not faced
with the possibility of constitutional wrongs, there is no private law
analogy which obligates the states to pay for constitutional wrongs in
their own courts, even when sovereign immunity has been swept away.
Adding respondeat superior liability for constitutional torts should not
significantly increase the risk of financial disaster for wel-managed
governmental entities, especially if the $10,000 maximum award for a
constitutional rights deprivation suggested above is incorporated into
the amendatory language for Section 1983.
Finally, the presumption of constitutionality should be fully incor-
porated into Section 1983 so that neither public officials nor govern-
mental units are held liable for enforcing official policy which is later
held to be unconstitutional. Assuming that a constitutional violation
does not occur until a court of competent jurisdiction has declared that
governmental action is impermissible, and that official acts are pre-
sumed to be valid until otherwise determined by a judicial body, then
no rights have been violated at the time of the action in question. The
Court's subsequent intervention declaring that the action will be con-
sidered unconstitutional in the future should not undermine the pre-
sumptive constitutionality of the original governmental action upon
which the entity's officials reasonably relied. This approach for Section
1983 in the context of awarding money damages will not deter suits for
injunctive and declaratory relief, however, as the attorneys' fees provi-
sion "'78 makes it apparent that such litigation need not be excessively
costly if the challenge is meritorious.
It is important to qualify the extent to which the presumption of
constitutionality should be employed under Section 1983. The pre-
sumption should be permitted only in those instances in which the pol-
icy in question could fairly have been considered constitutional.
Certainly there should be no refuge in the limitation of liability for
governmental units which continue to employ an obviously unconstitu-
tional policy. 179
The line drawing which would be required to implement this sug-
gestion is complex, but it is no more complicated than that undertaken
178. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
179. For example, a "whites only" employment policy should not under any stretch of the
imagination claim justification under this defense in light of equal protection decisions rendered
during the past thirty years.
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when courts attempt to make the necessary determinations under the
qualified good faith immunity rules surrounding individual defendants
in Section 1983 litigation. As currently employed, the court must deter-
mine whether the officer should have known that his or her conduct
was violative of a clearly established constitutional right of the victim.
Adherence to the suggestions outlined above does not impose an im-
possible burden on the courts, but simply requires them to continue the
line drawing in a different setting.
An amendment to Section 1983 providing that governmental units
would not be liable in damages for policies and actions which were
presumptively constitutional at the time they were adopted or enforced
would be a proper allocation of statutory risks and benefits for the indi-
vidual and the governmental units involved. The individual is pro-
tected from all of those wrongs which are a matter of settled law; the
governmental unit is protected from liability imposed retroactively by a
judicial constitutional decision. Lastly, the continued possibility of in-
junctive and declaratory relief in conjunction with awards of attorneys'
fees provides an incentive to seek an interpretation of the Constitution
which expands the rights of individuals into new areas.
VI. CONCLUSION
While these suggestions are not the total solution to the remedial
problems surrounding the vindication of federal constitutional rights,
they are a step in the direction of making real the promise voiced by
the Sipreme Court over the past two hundred years. There is no doubt
that current case law leads to the conclusion that at least some constitu-
tional rights have been rendered "worthless" in terms of redress
through an action for money damages under Section 1983. It is time to
begin a serious effort to effect a more adequate federal remedy for the
vindication of these priceless constitutional rights.
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